ECN 710 : Advanced Macroeconomics

Chapter 3: The standard neoclassical model Ramsey optimal growth model

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January 07, 2025





Economic Environment: Preferences

3 Production Technology

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- In the Solow model, the savings rate is constant and exogenous.
- In the neoclassical growth model,
 - The preferences (utilities) of households are clearly specified.
 - Mouseholds choose consumption and investment optimally to maximize their utility.
- The neoclassical growth model is also called the Ramsey model or the Cass-Koopmans model.
- Difference with the Solow model:
 - The endogenous treatment of savings and labor supply.



2 Economic Environment: Preferences

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Economic Environment: Preferences (1/5)

- Finite horizon and discrete time.
- The household derives utility from consumption and leisure.
- Let $c_t \equiv C_t/L_t$ and z_t be per capita consumption and leisure at time *t*. C_t : total consumption and L_t : population size.
- Preferences are defined over consumption and leisure paths, $\mathbf{x} = \{x_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, with $x_t = (c_t, z_t)$, and are represented by the utility function

$$\begin{array}{cccc} \mathscr{U} : & \mathbb{X}^{\infty} & \to & \mathbb{R} \\ & x & \mapsto & \mathscr{U} \left(x_0, x_1, \ldots \right) \end{array}$$
 (1)

 \mathbb{X} is the domain of x_t and is typically $\mathbb{R}_+ \times [0, 1]$.





Preferences are said to be recursive if there exists a function W : X× R → R (often called a utility aggregator) such that, for any {x_t}[∞]_{t=0},

$$\mathscr{U}(x_0, x_1, \ldots) = W[x_0, \mathscr{U}(x_1, x_2, \ldots)]$$

• Thus, each $\{x_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ induces a utility path $\{\mathscr{U}_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ according to the following recursion

$$\mathscr{U}_t = W(x_t, \mathscr{U}_{t+1})$$

• Preferences are additively separable if there exist functions v_t such that

$$\mathscr{U}(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} v_t(x_t).$$

• $v_t(x_t)$: the utility at period 0 from consumption and leisure at period t.

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Economic Environment: Preferences (3/5)

- We will assume that preferences are recursive and additively separable.
 - \implies The utility aggregator W must be linear in its second argument:
 - \implies There exists a function $U : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ and a scalar $\beta \in \mathbb{R}$ such that

 $W(x,y)=U(x)+\beta y.$

This implies that

$$\mathscr{U}_t = U(x_t) + \beta \, \mathscr{U}_{t+1}$$

or equivalently,

$$\mathscr{U}_t = \sum_{ au=0}^{\infty} eta^{ au} U(x_{t+ au})$$

• $\beta \in (0,1)$ is the discount factor and U is called the instantaneous utility function.

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Economic Environment: Preferences (4/5)



• We assume that the maximum amount of time per period is 1. Thus,

$$\mathbb{X} = \mathbb{R}_+ \times [0, 1].$$

• Special case t = 0

$$\mathscr{U}_0 = \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \beta^{\tau} U(x_{\tau}) = \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \beta^{\tau} U(c_{\tau}, z_{\tau})$$

*U*₀ is the function that the household seeks to optimize by choosing a path of consumption and leisure {c_t, z_t}[∞]_{t=0}.

Economic Environment: Neoclassical Preferences (5/5)

Assumption 1

The function U must be neoclassical, i.e.:

- Continuous and twice differentiable.
- Strictly increasing and strictly concave

 $egin{aligned} U_{c}(c,z) > 0 > U_{cc}(c,z) \ U_{z}(c,z) > 0 > U_{zz}(c,z) \ U_{cz}^{2} < U_{cc}U_{zz}. \end{aligned}$

• Satisfies the Inada conditions:

$$\lim_{c\to 0} U_c = \infty, \quad \lim_{c\to \infty} U_c = 0, \quad \lim_{z\to 0} U_z = \infty \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{z\to 1} U_z = 0.$$

(2)



Economic Environment: Preferences



4 Social Planner's Problem



Economic Environment: The Firm 1/5

• All firms have access to the same production technology:

 \implies The economy has a representative firm.

- Factor and product markets are competitive.
- The aggregate production function for the single final good is

$$Y(t) = F(K_t, L_t, A_t)$$
(3)

- K_t and L_t : demand for capital and labor at time t.
- A_t is the technology at time t.





(4)

Assumption 2

(Continuity, Differentiability, Diminishing and Positive Marginal Products, and Constant Returns to Scale).

The production function $F : \mathbb{R}^3_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is twice differentiable in K and L, and satisfies:

$$F_{K}(K,L,A) \equiv \frac{\partial F(\cdot)}{\partial K} > 0, \quad F_{L}(K,L,A) \equiv \frac{\partial F(\cdot)}{\partial L} > 0$$
$$F_{KK}(K,L,A) \equiv \frac{\partial^{2} F(\cdot)}{\partial K^{2}} < 0, \quad F_{LL}(K,L,A) \equiv \frac{\partial^{2} F(\cdot)}{\partial L^{2}} < 0$$

Furthermore, F has constant returns to scale in K and L.

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(5)

Assumption 3:

(Inada Conditions).

The production function $F : \mathbb{R}^3_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+$ satisfies the Inada conditions:


$$\lim_{K \to 0} F_K(K, L, A) = \infty \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{K \to \infty} F_K(K, L, A) = 0, \quad \forall L > 0$$
$$\lim_{L \to 0} F_L(K, L, A) = \infty \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{L \to \infty} F_L(K, L, A) = 0, \quad \forall K > 0$$

 \implies Ensure the existence of interior equilibria;

 \implies All factors of production are necessary, i.e.

$$F(0, L, A) = F(K, 0, A) = 0.$$
 (6)

Economic Environment: The Firm (3/4)



• In intensive notation (i.e., the production function per worker):

$$y_t \equiv \frac{Y_t}{L} = F\left(\frac{K_t}{L}, \frac{L_t}{L}, A_t\right) \equiv F(k_t, \ell_t)$$

where A_t is assumed constant (equal to 1), $k_t \equiv K_t/L$, and $\ell_t \equiv L_t/L$.

• Factor prices:

$$R_t = F_k(k_t, \ell_t) \tag{7}$$

$$w_t = F_L(k_t, \ell_t) \tag{8}$$

Economic Environment: The Firm (4/4)



• The time constraint is given by:

$$\ell_t + z_t \le 1. \tag{9}$$

 z_t and ℓ_t are interpreted as the fractions of time the household spends on leisure and work, respectively.

• Since the economy is closed, the resource constraint (per worker) is given by:

$$c_t + i_t \le y_t. \tag{10}$$

where i_t is the investment per worker at time t.

Technology and Resource Constraint

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• The law of motion for the capital stock is:

$$k_{t+1} = i_t + (1 - \delta)k_t.$$
 (11)

• By combining equations (10) and (11), we obtain:

$$c_t + k_{t+1} \le F(k_t, \ell_t) + (1 - \delta)k_t \tag{12}$$

• Finally, we impose the following natural non-negativity constraints:

$$c_t \geq 0, \quad \ell_t \geq 0, \quad z_t \geq 0, \quad k_t \geq 0.$$

• In equilibrium, the time constraint will be saturated, which implies:

$$\ell_t = 1 - z_t. \tag{13}$$



Economic Environment: Preferences

3 Production Technology





- We begin the analysis of the neoclassical growth model by considering the optimal allocation of a benevolent social planner.
- The SP chooses the static and intertemporal allocation of resources in the economy to maximize social welfare.
- We will later determine the allocations in a decentralized competitive market environment.
- We will show that the two allocations coincide.

Social Planner's Problem (2/3)



The SP chooses a path {c_t, ℓ_t, k_{t+1}}[∞]_{t=0} that maximizes utility subject to the economy's resource constraint, with a given initial k₀ > 0:

$$\max_{\{c_t, \ell_t, k_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathscr{U}_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t, 1 - \ell_t)$$

$$c_t + k_{t+1} \le (1 - \delta) k_t + F(k_t, \ell_t), \quad \forall t \ge 0,$$

$$c_t \ge 0, \quad \ell_t \in [0, 1], \quad k_{t+1} \ge 0, \quad \forall t \ge 0,$$

$$k_0 > 0 \text{ given.}$$

• The household will never choose $c_t = 0$, $k_{t+1} = 0$, $\ell_t = 0$, or $\ell_t = 1$. Why?

 $\implies c_t \ge 0, \quad \ell_t \in [0,1], \quad k_{t+1} \ge 0$ will often be ignored in the solution.

Social Planner's Problem (3/3)

- Let μ_t denote the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint.
- The Lagrangian for the social planner's problem is written as follows:

$$\mathscr{L}_{0} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} U(c_{t}, 1 - \ell_{t}) + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \mu_{t} \left[(1 - \delta) k_{t} + F(k_{t}, \ell_{t}) - k_{t+1} - c_{t} \right]$$

• The first-order conditions (FOCs) are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathscr{L}_0}{\partial c_t} = \beta^t U_c(c_t, 1 - \ell_t) - \mu_t = 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathscr{L}_0}{\partial \ell_t} = -\beta^t U_z(c_t, 1 - \ell_t) + \mu_t F_L(k_t, \ell_t) = 0,$$
(14)

$$\frac{\partial \mathscr{L}_{0}}{\partial k_{t+1}} = -\mu_{t} + \mu_{t+1} \left[(1 - \delta) + F_{\mathcal{K}} \left(k_{t+1}, \ell_{t+1} \right) \right] = 0.$$
(16)

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• By combining the above, we obtain:

$$\frac{U_{z}(c_{t}, 1 - \ell_{t})}{U_{c}(c_{t}, 1 - \ell_{t})} = F_{L}(k_{t}, \ell_{t}),$$

$$\frac{U_{c}(c_{t}, 1 - \ell_{t})}{\beta U_{c}(c_{t+1}, 1 - \ell_{t+1})} = 1 - \delta + F_{K}(k_{t+1}, \ell_{t+1}).$$
(17)
(18)

- Equation (17) means that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals the marginal product of labor.
- Equation (18) equates the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption to the net marginal product of capital (including depreciation).
- The latter condition is called the **Euler equation**.

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Characterization of Equilibrium (2/2)



• Interpretation of equation (17):



• Interpretation of the Euler equation (18):

$$\underbrace{\underbrace{U_c(c_t, 1-\ell_t)}_{\text{Utility lost}}}_{\substack{\text{by saving $$1$}}} = \underbrace{\left[1-\delta+F_{\mathcal{K}}(k_{t+1},\ell_{t+1})\right]}_{\substack{\text{Return in }t+1}} \times \underbrace{\underbrace{\beta U_c(c_{t+1}, 1-\ell_{t+1})}_{\substack{\text{Utility of consuming}}}\right]. \tag{20}$$

- Impatience: If β decreases, current consumption increases, and future consumption decreases.
- Return on investment: If it increases, more saving occurs for greater future consumption.

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Social Planner's Problem: Finite Horizon 1/6



Suppose the horizon is finite, $T < \infty$.

• The social planner's problem can be written as:

$$\begin{split} \max_{\{c_t, \ell_t, k_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^T} \mathscr{U}_0 &= \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t U(c_t, 1 - \ell_t) \\ c_t + k_{t+1} &\leq (1 - \delta) k_t + F(k_t, \ell_t), \quad \forall t = 0, \cdots, T, \\ c_t &\geq 0, \quad \ell_t \in [0, 1], \quad k_{t+1} \geq 0, \quad \forall t = 0, \cdots, T, \\ k_0 &> 0 \text{ given.} \end{split}$$

• The planner will never choose $c_t = 0$, $\ell_t = 0$, or $\ell_t = 1$, $\forall t = 0, \dots, T$.

Social Planner's Problem: Finite Horizon 2/6

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- For $k_{t+1} \ge 0$, the decision becomes non-trivial due to the choice at T.
- We need to introduce a multiplier λ_t for this constraint.
- The Lagrangian for the social planner's problem is:

$$\mathscr{L}_{0} = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \beta^{t} U(c_{t}, 1-\ell_{t}) + \sum_{t=0}^{T} \mu_{t} \left[(1-\delta)k_{t} + F(k_{t},\ell_{t}) - k_{t+1} - c_{t} \right] + \sum_{t=0}^{T} \lambda_{t} k_{t+1}.$$

- We calculate the FOCs and solve the problem.
- We can also use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimization with non-negativity constraints.

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Kuhn-Tucker Theorem

Assume x^* maximizes the following problem:

$$\max_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(x)$$

s.t. $g_1(x) = b_1, \dots, g_M(x) = b_M,$
 $h_1(x) \le c_1, \dots, h_K(x) \le c_K.$

- This is a constrained maximization problem.
 - *M* equality constraints,
 - *K* inequality constraints.
- Assume the constraint qualification condition is satisfied at x^* .



Social Planner's Problem: Finite Horizon (4/6)



• Form the Lagrangian:

$$L = f(x) + \sum_{m=1}^{M} \lambda_m (b_m - g_m(x)) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \mu_k (c_k - h_k(x))$$

• First-order conditions: find x^* such that

$$\frac{\partial L(x^*)}{\partial x_n} = \frac{\partial f(x^*)}{\partial x_n} - \sum_{m=1}^M \lambda_m \frac{\partial g_m(x^*)}{\partial x_n} - \sum_{k=1}^K \mu_k \frac{\partial h_k(x^*)}{\partial x_n} = 0,$$

for all $n = 1, \ldots, N$, and

$$h_k(x) \leq c_k, \quad \mu_k \geq 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \mu_k\left(c_k - h_k\left(x^*\right)\right) = 0,$$

for all $k = 1, \ldots, K$.

Social Planner's Problem: Finite Horizon (5/6)



• Return to the Social Planner's (SP) problem. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to k_{T+1} are written as:

$$\frac{\partial \mathscr{L}_{0}}{\partial k_{T+1}} \ge 0, \quad k_{T+1} \ge 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \mathscr{L}_{0}}{\partial k_{T+1}} k_{T+1} = 0$$

$$\implies \quad \lambda_{T} \ge 0, \quad k_{T+1} \ge 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_{T} k_{T+1} = 0.$$
(21)

- This implies that $k_{T+1} = 0$, meaning the shadow value of k_{T+1} is zero.
- When $T = \infty$, the terminal condition $\mu_T k_{T+1} = 0$ is replaced by the **transversality condition**:

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \mu_t k_{t+1} = 0. \tag{22}$$

• This means that the discounted shadow value of capital converges to zero:

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \beta^t U_c(c_t, \ell_t) k_{t+1} = 0.$$
(23)



Proposition

The path $\{c_t, \ell_t, k_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ is a solution to the social planner's problem if and only if the following conditions hold for all $t \ge 0$:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{U_z(c_t, 1 - \ell_t)}{U_c(c_t, 1 - \ell_t)} &= F_L(k_t, \ell_t), \\ \frac{U_c(c_t, 1 - \ell_t)}{3U_c(c_{t+1}, 1 - \ell_{t+1})} &= 1 - \delta + F_K(k_{t+1}, \ell_{t+1}), \\ k_{t+1} &= F(k_t, \ell_t) + (1 - \delta)k_t - c_t. \end{aligned}$$

The initial condition is

 $k_0 > 0$ (given).

The transversality condition is

$$\lim_{t\to\infty}\beta^t U_c(c_t,1-\ell_t)k_{t+1}=0.$$

Application (1/2)



Consider the following utility function:

$$u(c_t,\ell_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma} - \frac{\ell_t^{\gamma}}{1+\gamma}.$$

- *u* is additively separable in consumption and leisure.
- The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption is

$$MRS = rac{eta u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)}.$$

• The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is

$$rac{\partial (c_{t+1}/c_t)}{\partial MRS} \cdot rac{MRS}{c_{t+1}/c_t} = rac{1}{\sigma}.$$



Consider the following neoclassical production function:

$$Y_t = F(K_t, L_t) = AK_t^{\alpha} L_t^{1-\alpha},$$

- where $0 < \alpha < 1$.
- *F* is a Cobb-Douglas production function.
- Output per worker is given by

$$y_t = \frac{Y_t}{L_t} = Ak_t^{\alpha} \ell^{1-\alpha}.$$

• Formulate the Social Planner's problem and solve it to derive the Euler equation in finite and infinite horizon.